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FINDERS KEEPERS: WHO HAS SAY OVER PRIVATE PROPERTY IN 
SPACE 
 




Current space law is unclear as to whether private entities may 
claim possession of resources extracted from their endeavors in outer 
space. The lack of certainty prevents private entities from entirely 
investing in infrastructure and capabilities to access new deposits of 
resources due to the depletion of minerals and resources on Earth. 
The establishment of a new space regime devoid of non-appropriation 
principles found in international law is necessary to motivate private 
entities to invest the capital in extracting and transporting space 
resources back to Earth.  
This Comment seeks to understand how the current framework of 
space law impacts the property rights of private entities and their 
claim to resources in space. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibited 
the claiming of property by sovereign nations. However, the concept 
of private entities now having the capability to extract resources from 
outer space has reignited the issue of property rights in outer space. 
With resources becoming scarcer or priced out of the market, the 
solution of mining these resources from celestial bodies has caused a 
new space race. Past multilateral agreements have dealt with similar 
discoveries such as the polymetallic nodules on the ocean floor; 
however, these agreements led to disputes as to ownership and the 
rights to extract said resources. With little to no support from the 
industrialized nations, the structure of any new regime must ensure 
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private entities the right to claim mined resources must be weighed 
against potential drawbacks in order to create a framework that 
balances the interest of the free market with that of the common 
heritage principle. In determining that a suitable framework fails to 
guide a new space regime, this Comment proposes that a new 
governing body comprising a rotation of space-faring and non-
spacefaring nations act as a regulatory body for the interest of all of 
humankind.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 4, 1957, the Space Age officially began when the 
Soviet Union launched Sputnik into orbit, the first successful, human-
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made satellite.1 A little more than a decade later, on July 20, 1969, 
American astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin 
became the first humans to land and step foot on the moon.2 Neil 
Armstrong marked the completion of John F. Kenney’s national goal 
of landing an astronaut on the moon when he radioed back to Earth 
“[t]hat’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.”3 The 
launch of Sputnik, the moon landing, and other endeavors achieved by 
the scientific community, kick-started a chain of events leading to the 
current ambition of exploring outer space and mining resources 
throughout the solar system.  
The push for unlocking low-cost space travel and space 
industrialization by entrepreneurs, like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos, 
propels the search for extraterrestrial materials such as water and 
minerals.4 According to NASA, minerals found in the asteroid belt 
between Mars and Jupiter contain an estimated value of approximately 
$100 billion for every person on Earth.5 However, uncertainty lingers 
because private entities are unsure that they will possess property 
rights to their payload or the mined celestial body.6 Celestial bodies 
refer to naturally occurring objects in space. The United States 
Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee 
(“COMSTAC”), an advisory body to the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s (“FAA”) Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation (“FAA-AST”), has undertaken review regarding the 
 
 1. Alan Boyle, Sputnik Started Space Race, Anxiety, NBC NEWS (Oct. 4, 1997), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3077890/ns/technology_and_science-space/t/sputnik-
started-space-race-anxiety/#.XaSEzHdFxl4 [https://perma.cc/36KV-3SKP]. 
 2. History.com Editors, 1969 Moon Landing, HISTORY (July 21, 2019), 
https://www.history.com/topics/space-exploration/moon-landing-1969 
[https://perma.cc/LM3K-E6ED]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Thomas Heath, Space-Mining May be Only a Decade Away. Really., 




 5. Andrew Wong, Space Mining Could Become a Real Thing — And it Could 
be Worth Trillions, CNBC (May 15, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/mining-asteroids-could-be-worth-trillions-of-
dollars.html [https://perma.cc/RP7J-E9JR]. 
 6. Leonard David, Mining the Moon? Space Property Rights Still Unclear, 
Experts Say, SPACE (July 25, 2014), https://www.space.com/26644-moon-asteroids-
resources-space-law.html [https://perma.cc/J69Q-JK3Y]. 
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granting of private property licenses.7 COMSTAC expressed a desire 
to confirm that private entity resource extractions may be owned and 
utilized as it deems appropriate.8  
The current framework of space law is a combination of 
agreements with the foundation of space law consisting of the 1967 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty”).9 At the time of signing, the 
Outer Space Treaty hoped to foster cooperative and peaceful 
exploration of outer space without discrimination of any kind.10 
However, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty contains the bane of 
private property rights in outer space, which forbids the national 
appropriation of the moon and other celestial bodies.11 While the 
Outer Space Treaty explicitly mentions the prohibition of public 
entities claiming celestial bodies, private enterprises risk failing to 
have their interest in property rights recognized by the global 
community. 
Private entities and investors grapple with the issues pertaining 
to their rights to mine and extract resources from outer space legally. 
Without further international recognition of their property rights, 
private entities may shy away from exploring the concept of celestial 
mining. The issue of not knowing what laws are applicable, or to 
whom private companies are accountable, impedes the progress 
private entities make in achieving their goal of harvesting 
extraterrestrial resources.  
Private entities fear that the non-appropriation clause of Article 
II of the Outer Space Treaty, the epicenter of the issue, will strip them 
of the right to transport their mined resources back to Earth. A new 
legal regime will likely need to be formed that facilitates the 
continuation of innovation and promotes the exploration of outer 
space. Whether or not past private and public international doctrines, 
i.e., the law of the sea, may provide guidance in creating a new 
doctrine of space law is yet to be determined.  
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. art. II. 
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The advancement in modern technology, along with the 
depletion of natural resources, creates a unique opportunity for private 
entities to resolve this issue through the exploitation of outer space. 
Space law is once again relevant due to its inadequacies in protecting 
the property rights of said entities in space. Part II will explore the 
different treaties and principles that gave rise to space law, and Part 
III will analyze whether the application of such principles should 
continue, or if the establishment of a new regime offers a more 
beneficial long-term solution. Part IV will then explore the structure 
of a new outer space regime and the enforcement of property rights. 
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES INFLUENCING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE 
LAW 
As the world continues to transform and evolve, lawmakers 
across the globe must adapt past laws or develop and ratify new laws 
to address current events and situations. The venture into outer space 
is similar to that of famous past explorations in which customary laws 
guided journeys, providing a framework of starting points for the 
crafting of the present-age space law. Space law must adapt and evolve 
as engineers and the science community make discoveries that past 
generations could only dream about. The United Nations General 
Assembly (“General Assembly”) maintains the view that 
“International Law” is not spatially restricted, and that its charter is 
relevant even in the outer reaches of outer space and to celestial 
bodies.12 When analogizing to present international treaties, the most 
applicable set of principles is that of the high seas.13 Based on the 
principle of res communis, issues arise because there is a lack of 
precise rules.14 Since the beginning of the space race in 1957, the 
United Nations facilitated general agreements on how space 
exploration should be conducted. However, an understanding of past 
and current laws is necessary to determine how to proceed in 
recognizing property rights in space for private entities. 
 
 12. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 255 (6th ed. 
2003). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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A. History of the Current Space Law Framework 
Space law is the body of law applicable to and involved in 
governing space-related activities.15 Space law is “associated with the 
rules, principles, and standards of international law appearing in the 
five international treaties and five sets of principles governing outer 
space,” originating under the supervision of the United Nations 
Organization.16 The foundation of space law, similar to general 
international law, is composed of matters such as international 
agreements, treaties, conventions, rules and regulations of 
international organizations, General Assembly resolutions, national 
laws, executive and administrative orders, and judicial decisions.17 
Following the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the General 
Assembly created an ad hoc committee concerned with identifying 
legal issues involving outer space activities.18 The Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”) was established in 1958 
and was made permanent on December 12, 1959.19 COPUOS is 
intended to endorse peaceful international collaboration and establish 
the common interest of humankind in outer space.20 It is the 
preeminent body regarding the formation of international space law, 
drafting five international treaties and five sets of principles regarding 
space-related activities.21 Topics covered by the treaties include non-
appropriation of outer space by any one country, arms control within 
space, and the freedom of exploration.22 The primary focus of the 
treaties being any and all activities performed in outer space be done 
 
 15. Space Law, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/2VEG-VYT7]. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Space Law, supra note 14; See generally For the Industry & the Private 
Sector, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/informationfor/faqs.html [https://perma.cc/BFD6-
T37F]. 
 18. Elizabeth Howell, Who Owns the Moon? Space Law & Outer Space Treaties, 
SPACE.COM (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.space.com/33440-space-law.html 
[https://perma.cc/9KGG-X8AL]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.; See generally TANJA MASSON-ZWAAN & MAHULENA HOFMAN, 
INTRODUCTION TO SPACE LAW (4th ed. 2019). 
 21. Space Law Treaties and Principles, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER 
SPACE AFFS., http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html 
[https://perma.cc/3LWF-U5YZ] (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 22. Id. 
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so to enhance the well-being of humankind and the promotion of 
international cooperation.23  
In 1966, COPUOS proposed the Outer Space Treaty, which 
was ratified soon after in 1967.24 The Outer Space Treaty forms the 
bedrock for international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of 
space and the development of new law.25 The Outer Space Treaty’s 
principles focus on exploration carried out for the benefit and in the 
interest of all countries (Art. I), preclusion of sovereign states from 
appropriating celestial bodies in outer space (Art. II), the performance 
of activities in outer space in accordance with international law (Art. 
III), and the prohibition of launching any kinds of objects or 
armaments into orbit that possess nuclear weapons or any other kinds 
of weapons of mass destruction (Art. IV).26 Of importance to this 
Comment is the language of Article II. Article II does not explicitly 
mention the property rights of private entities; the failure to do so led 
to a split regarding whether such rights breach the Outer Space 
Treaty.27 
COPUOS concluded four more treaties following the 
ratification of the Outer Space Treaty.28 The second treaty was the 
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (“Rescue 
Agreement”), which entered into force in 1968.29 The Rescue 
Agreement elaborates on Articles V and VII of the Outer Space 
Treaty.30 It provides that nations rescue and assist distressed 
astronauts, which also includes returning them to their launching 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9. 
 26. Id. at arts. I–IV. 
 27. Id. art. II; Elizabeth Howell, Who Owns the Moon? Space Law & Outer 
Space Treaties, SPACE.COM (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.space.com/33440-space-
law.html [https://perma.cc/9KGG-X8AL]. 
 28. Space Law Treaties and Principles, supra note 21. 
 29. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the 
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER 
SPACE AFFS., 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introrescueagreement.h
tml [https://perma.cc/6QLA-ZCCR] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020); Agreement on the 
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 5, U.N. 
Doc. A/6716 (1968), 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement]. 
 30. Rescue Agreement, supra note 29. 
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state.31 Also, states, upon request, are to provide assistance in 
recovering space objects that re-enter Earth outside of the territory of 
its proper owner.32  
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused 
by Space Objects (“Liability Convention”), the third of the five 
COPUOS treaties, was under the scrutiny of the Legal Subcommittee 
of COPUOS for approximately nine years.33 The General Assembly 
ultimately reached an agreement in 1971, and the Liability Convention 
entered into force in 1972.34 The Liability Convention expounds on 
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty providing “that a launching 
[s]tate shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage 
caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, 
and liable for damage due to its faults in space.”35 The Liability 
Convention possesses the procedures regarding claim settlement for 
damages.36 
The COPUOS Legal Subcommittee drafted the Convention on 
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (“Registration 
Convention”), the fourth treaty, from 1962 until the General Assembly 
adopted the treaty in 1974.37 The convention entered into force in 
September 1976.38 This treaty builds upon desires in prior treaties to 
provide a mechanism to assist identifying space objects.39 The 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the 
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER 
SPACE AFFS., 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introrescueagreement.h
tml [https://perma.cc/6QLA-ZCCR] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020); Rescue Agreement, 
supra note 29. 
 34. Id.; See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 
[hereinafter Liability Convention]. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, UNITED 
NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introregistration-
convention.html [https://perma.cc/77Q8-H7SZ] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
 38. Id.; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space, 
opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15, 16, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201023/volume-1023-I-
15020-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9X4-NYDT] [hereinafter Registration 
Convention]. 
 39. Id.; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
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Registration Convention made a request for the Secretary-General to 
maintain the registration and provide open admittance to the 
information.40 
The fifth and final treaty by COPUOS was the Agreement 
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (“Moon Agreement”).41 The General Assembly adopted the 
agreement in 1979; however, the Moon Agreement lacked widespread 
ratification, with only five countries signing by July 1984.42 The 
overall purpose of the Moon Agreement was to reinforce the principles 
highlighted in the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and their 
application to the Moon and other celestial bodies.43 The Moon 
Agreement seeks to encourage peaceful exploration, avoid disruption 
of celestial environments, and alert the United Nations of the location 
and purpose of any construction of a station on a celestial body.44  
In addition, the Moon and its natural resources are identified 
as belonging to the common heritage of humankind and, should 
exploitation of these resources become feasible, an international 
regime should be created to oversee such progress.45  
Since its inception, the Moon Agreement, containing the 
resource limitation found within the common heritage principle, 
garnered little support internationally, particularly within the United 
States.46 With only fourteen signatories, none being spacefaring 
 
UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introregistration-
convention.html [https://perma.cc/77Q8-H7SZ] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
 40. Registration Convention, supra note 38, at art. V. 
 41. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18. 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, 
https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_34_68E.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ3U-
HHJ7] [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. 
 42. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/intromoon-
agreement.html [https://perma.cc/V9EW-L4WK] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020); Moon 
Agreement, supra note 41, at art. IX, para.3. 
 43. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/intromoon-
agreement.html [https://perma.cc/V9EW-L4WK] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
 44. See Moon Agreement, supra note 41, at arts. III, VII, IX. 
 45. Id. at art. XI, para. 5. 
 46. Rand Simberg, Property Rights in Space, THE NEW ATLANTIS, 
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/property-rights-in-space 
[https://perma.cc/XY2M-U8VG] (last visited Jan. 19, 2020). 
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nations, the Moon Agreement lacks international recognition as law.47 
However, the provisions of the Moon Agreement may block the full 
economic potential and development of space.48 A comprehension of 
international law aids in understanding the principle of the common 
heritage of humankind emphasized in the Moon Agreement. 
B. Customary International Law and its Underlying Principles 
International law, also known as public international law or the 
law of nations, is composed of a multitude of legal rules, norms, and 
standards overseeing the relationships between different sovereign 
actors and other internationally recognized entities on the global 
stage.49 Over time, international law grew to include individual 
entities and international organizations—crucial elements of 
contemporary international law previously omitted from the 
definition.50 International law is developing to incorporate not only 
rules but also non-binding and influential principles, practices, and 
assertions blended with complicated structures and processes.51 The 
breadth of international law has grown from the conventional topics 
ranging from war, peace, and diplomacy to encompassing “human 
rights, economic and trade issues, space law, and international 
organizations.”52 International law should be distinguished from 
international comity, the courtesies afforded to foreign states, and 
from the subject of conflict of laws or private international law, which 
is the determination of municipal law involving foreign elements.53 
International law operates independently of the system of laws 
concerning the legal orders of a particular state.54 There are also no 
courts of international law that possess complete jurisdiction over 
sovereign states.55 Thus, neither an authoritative international body to 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Malcolm Shaw, International Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 13, 
2019), https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-law [https://perma.cc/9KQ9-
3QMS]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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enforce a judgment or the law exists, nor is there an overarching 
executive body with supreme authority.56 
Public international law is composed of multiple conventions 
and principles. Within these international principles, the law of the sea 
(particularly the provisions regarding the deep seabed), the Antarctica 
Treaty of 1959, and the res communis principle all influenced the non-
appropriation provision in the series of space treaties.  
1. Aboard the High Seas  
“The modern law governing the high seas has its foundation in 
the rule that the high seas are not open to acquisition by occupation on 
the part of states individually or collectively: it is res extra 
commercium.”57 A brief history demonstrates that the high seas 
doctrine emerged from two different factors: the increasing dominance 
of maritime powers and the reduction of influence from states favoring 
closed seas.58  
The fifteenth century saw states favoring appropriation of or at 
least exclusive rights over the seas, and the Papal Bulls of 1493 and 
1506 disseminated the oceans around the world to Spain and 
Portugal.59 Elizabeth I challenged the Spanish monopoly on the West 
Indies and later affirmed the freedom of the seas in response to Spain’s 
protest of the English Drake expedition.60 Later on, English policies 
in the seventeenth-century reversed course, promoting the principle of 
closed seas.61 This time period signified the peak of the mare clausum 
(closed sea) until the eventual fall of the British claim to sovereignty 
by the late eighteenth century.62  
During the transitioning of the law of the sea, Dutch jurist 
Hugo Grotius in 1609, argued in Mare Liberum that the high seas 
should be free for navigation and fishing because natural law forbids 
ownership of resources created for universal use.63 Grotius’ idea came 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 224. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a 
Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 363, 390 (2004). 
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at a time when the sea was thought to possess “limitless” resources.64 
Grotius stated that the seas were open to all for navigation and fishing 
because natural law forbids the ownership of things that were created 
to be shared by all.65 His perception was that so long as there was no 
interference, nations were free to exploit resources.66 Grotius further 
argued that rights to the sea could not exist in the same manner as 
rights of land; thus, the sea was “free to all and subject to none.”67 The 
law of the high seas evolved from a theory of limited access to one of 
unfettered access by the eighteenth century.68 The principle of 
freedom of the seas holds that a state cannot appropriate areas of the 
sea except for its own vessel when outside its national waters.69 
The late eighteenth century saw the implementation of the 
cannon-shot rule, and claims to large areas of the sea ceased to exist.70 
The cannon-shot rule held that a nation’s sovereignty extends up to the 
range of a cannonball.71 The range was first defined as one marine 
league or three miles in diplomatic practice.72  
Naval power and commercial interests in the nineteenth 
century dictated British, French, and American support for the 
principle of freedom of the sea and the concept of shared use.73 In 
terms of jurisdiction on the high seas, the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (“UNCLOS III”) upheld the general 
principle that vessels on the high seas are only subjected to the 
authority of the state whose flag they fly.74 With the lack of any 
territorial sovereignty upon the high seas, no state of any kind can 
assert jurisdiction over foreign vessels.75 
The law of the sea provides a foundation for determining the 
proper regime to install regarding the application of private property 
rights to celestial bodies. This is particularly important concerning the 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 224. 
 69. Tannenwald, supra note 63, at 390. 
 70. BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 225. 
 71. Id. at 180. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 225. 
 74. Id. at 238; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 90, opened 
for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 75. BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 238. 
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seabed and ocean floor, which is beyond the jurisdiction of states. In 
applying the pre-existing seabed regime of the high seas, the seabed 
could not be, in principle, appropriated by a sovereign state.76 Historic 
title and prescription played a role in protecting interests such as 
sedentary fisheries.77  
Concerns such as overfishing and pollution pushed the 
international community to begin codifying ocean law.78 The first 
convention (“UNCLOS I”) took place in 1958 and resulted in four 
non-binding conventions.79 The results from UNCLOS I “largely 
asserted the traditional law of the sea, codified traditional practices of 
the great powers, and left large gaps which ‘continued to widen during 
the subsequent decades.’”80 Issues that remained unsettled included 
defining limits to territorial seas, establishing jurisdictions involving 
fisheries, and imposing limits on the continental shelf.81 These 
unresolved issues, as well as others from the first convention, 
ultimately led to a third reconvening in 1974.82 
2. The Regime of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor: Common 
Heritage Designation 
In the 1960s, prior regimes did not cover the viability of 
collecting resources from the ocean floor.83 Proposals addressing the 
issue suggested either portioning the ocean floor between coastal 
states or granting a mining operation to individual entities.84 Immense 
deposits of polymetallic nodules containing manganese, nickel, 
copper, and cobalt caused this new development in the law of the sea.85  
Dr. Arvid Pardo, Malta’s United Nations representative, 
proposed that the seabed and its resources, beyond the limit of national 
jurisdiction, should be held as part of the “common heritage of 
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mankind.”86 Briefly, the common heritage of mankind (common 
heritage principle) represents that:  
“certain global commons or elements regarded as 
beneficial to humanity as a whole should not be 
unilaterally exploited by individual states or their 
nationals, nor by corporations or other entities, but 
rather should be exploited by under some sort of 
international arrangement or regime for the benefit of 
mankind as a whole.”87  
The proposal became part of UNCLOS III, resulting in comprehensive 
internationalization of the deep seabed mineral resources.88 The 
addition of the common heritage principle, also found in the Moon 
Agreement, prohibited the ability of sovereign entities to claim rights 
over any part of the area—defined as “the sea-bed and ocean floor and 
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”—or its 
resources. The principle also suggests that the International Sea-Bed 
Authority should organize and control all activities exclusively.89 
Developed western nations, who have not signed the UNCLOS 
III agreement, oppose such a change and opine that the ordinary 
regime of the freedom of the seas should apply to the resources located 
in the deep seabed.90 Thus, the United States and other developed 
nations, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, 
propagated legislation to permit and regulate mining of the seabed 
resources, forming a “Reciprocating States Regime” that offered 
mutual recognition of deep-sea mining activities.91 
3. Antarctica Treaty of 1959 
In addition to the law of the sea, international law encompasses 
other legal treaties that have influenced space treaties. The space law 
regime created by the ratification of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is 
partly analogous to that of the Antarctica Treaty of 1959.92 The intent 
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behind the Antarctic Treaty is to promote only peaceful intentions and 
the freedom to perform scientific research and cooperation towards 
that goal.93 The treaty allows the presence of military units, only for 
peaceful purposes, and prohibits nuclear explosions.94 A provision 
within the treaty states that: 
[n]o acts or activities taking place while the Treaty is 
in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting 
or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an 
existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica 
shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.95 
The quoted provision is not solely limited to contracted parties 
according to the text, and the Treaty as a whole leads to the 
questioning of non-signatories’ obligations.96  
The issue of exploiting minerals has also appeared in the 
Antarctica Treaty.97 Developments against the eventuality of 
discovering methods to extract minerals have provoked opposition.98 
One contention is that of establishing a regime for the exploitation of 
minerals below the ice sheets, while others want to focus on 
conservation.99 
4. Res Communis in Outer Space 
The res communis (defined as a common thing) and res nullius 
(defined as something without a master) maxims are two legal 
concepts that heavily influenced the laws of the high seas, the polar 
regions of Antarctica, and outer space.100 The development of space 
law raised the question of the legal status of outer space and whether 
or not celestial resources fell under the maxim of res communis or res 
nullius.101 
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With the Outer Space Treaty’s commencement in 1967, the res 
communis doctrine dominated conversations regarding the 
international law on exploiting outer space and its resources by 
sovereign entities and individuals; this doctrine states that outer space 
is property to all of humankind and is not limited to solely one 
entity.102 The Outer Space Treaty’s Article I goes as far as cementing 
the doctrine of res communis omnium (a thing of the entire 
community) by holding that the exploitation and exploration of outer 
space is a “province of all mankind.”103 The Outer Space Treaty 
maintains that outer space is an extra-jurisdictional territory, 
prohibiting states from exercising their sovereign rights.104 
The application of the common heritage principle in the 1967 
Outer Space Treaty has proved divisive and polarizing ever since its 
emergence.105 Its philosophical nature forces radical departures from 
what may be the norm because it questions the management of 
globally valuable resources; applying the common heritage principle 
requires a reexamination of traditional principles and doctrines 
concerning international law.106 Such classical principles include: 
“acquisition of territory, consent based sources of international law, 
sovereignty, equality, resource allocation, and international 
personality.”107 The underlying premise of res communis may 
effectively limit expansion and innovation in outer space in two 
particular areas: national security and property rights and 
commercialization.108 
C. Current National Legislations 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty calls for proper 
supervision by the appropriate State Party for non-governmental 
activities in space.109 In anticipation of the race to space, national 
legislatures adopted their own interpretation regarding the authority of 
space mining and the procedures for obtaining licenses. The United 
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States and Luxemburg took their own proactive approach to address 
the exploitation of space resources. 
1. The 2015 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act 
President Barack Obama signed the U.S. Commercial Space 
Launch Competitiveness Act (“Space Act”) into law with the intention 
to foster and promote a pro-growth environment for the development 
of a commercial space agency through private investments and the 
stabilizing of regulatory conditions.110 In doing so, the United States 
became the first country to adopt a national regulatory framework 
concerning space resources.111 Title IV of the Space Act recognizes 
the property rights of United States citizens who engage in celestial 
commercial mining; this further encourages the commercial 
exploration and utilization of celestial resources.112 The Space Act 
defines space resource as an “abiotic resource in situ in outer 
space.”113  
Three conditions must be satisfied to receive protection from 
the statute.114 First, the actor engaged in space activities must be 
classified as a United States citizen pursuant to Title 51 of the U.S. 
Code.115 United States citizens are natural persons of United States 
citizenship or legal entities subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.116 Second, United States authorities must provide the citizen 
authorization for space activities.117 The United States utilizes “an 
‘enhanced’ version of the Federal Aviation Administration’s payload 
review process to issue mission authorizations” because, at the time of 
adoption, there was no government agency competent or qualified to 
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authorize space activities.118 Third, the Space Act contains a 
Disclaimer of Extraterrestrial Sovereignty, stating that the United 
States does not assert sovereignty over any celestial body.119 
2. The Entry of Luxemburg into Space Law 
On July 13, 2017, Luxemburg became the first European 
country to have a legal framework that recognized property rights in 
space for the utilization and extraction of materials in accordance with 
international law.120 Luxemburg utilized the United States’ own space 
property law as a model when developing the “Law on the Exploration 
and Use of Space Resources of Luxemburg.”121 This law marks a 
stepping stone in the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg’s plan to transform 
the nation into the global center for space mining.122 Following the 
signing of the new law, the Luxemburg government established the 
Spaceresources.Lu initiative to support the space resources 
industry.123 
D. Legal Framework of the International Space Station 
The International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement 
(“IGA”), signed on January 29, 1998, is an international treaty 
consisting of fifteen space-faring nations who are part of the Space 
Station Project.124 Three international cooperation agreements make 
up the Space Station’s legal framework.125 The IGA bound its 
members to a long-term cooperative agreement based on “genuine 
partnership, for the detailed design, development, operation, and 
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utilization of a permanently inhabited civil Space Station for peaceful 
purposes, in accordance with international law (Article I).”126  
Following the IGA were the four Memoranda of 
Understandings (“MoUs”) “between the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (“NASA”) and the following cooperating Space 
Agencies: European Space Agency (“ESA”), Canadian Space Agency 
(“CSA”), Russian Federal Space Agency (“Roscosmos”), and Japan 
Aerospace Exploration Agency (“JAXA”).”127 The objective intent of 
the MoUs is to delineate the responsibilities and duties involving the 
design, operation, and utilization of the Space Station.128 The MoUs 
also define the management structure and interfaces necessary to 
ensure effective utilization.129 Lastly, several mutual Implementing 
Agreements dictate the procedure for implementing the MoUs, 
distributing guidelines and tasks amongst the signatories.130 
Regarding jurisdiction, the IGA signatories may extend 
national jurisdiction to elements of the station, which they have agreed 
to prove, and over their nationals who are in or around the Space 
Station.131 Therefore, the owners of the specific elements aboard the 
Space Station are legally responsible for said elements; European 
members are recognized as a solitary entity identified as the European 
Partners, but each individual European country “may extend their 
respective national laws and regulation to the European elements, 
equipment, and personnel.”132 The MoUs recognize a partner’s 
jurisdiction and national law application in numerous matters.133 
Therefore, conflicts of jurisdiction aboard the space station are 
resolved “through the application of other rules and procedures 
already developed nationally and internationally.”134 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SPACE LAW 
Space law has come a long way since its inception following 
the launch of Sputnik in 1957. With the progression in science and an 
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impending shortage of raw materials, the current installation of treaties 
needs to change to address growing concerns related to space 
exploration and development. History provides a pool of resources and 
precedents for addressing the legal issues that arise in space. 
The collection of space treaties may be interpreted as limiting 
sovereign entities from staking claims to celestial resources and 
leaving private citizens and enterprises free to extract such resources 
from outer space.135 Article II of the Outer Space Treaty explicitly 
forbids any appropriation by means of use or occupation.136 The 
foundation of space law was formulated at a time when the Iron 
Curtain was drawn across Europe; national governments dominated 
space activities, and commercial space enterprises were in their 
infancy.137 The effort to find a compromise between existing legal 
frameworks and international agreements, regarding the private 
property rights of private entities in space, requires a resolution to 
identify the most appropriate authority to govern private interest in 
space.  
Regulations based on customary laws make up the current 
framework of space law.138 The analysis in the next Section will dive 
into the argument of whether customary international law provides a 
sufficient perspective regarding the private property rights of non-
sovereign states or if a new legal framework must be forged. 
A. Does Celestial Mining Violate the Space Treaties? 
The emergence of projects to capture and transport resources 
from space back to Earth sparked discussions within COPUOS 
regarding two main points: (1) are space resource collection projects 
compatible with the Article II principle of prohibiting ownership 
rights within the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; and (2) do such projects 
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conflict with the common heritage principle?139 The Moon 
Agreement’s language denouncing appropriation has resulted in 
different interpretations. 
1. Non-Appropriation of Space Resources 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states that “outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of occupation, or by 
any other means.”140 Those who oppose commercial resource 
extraction view the Article II provision as broadly precluding all forms 
of resource appropriation—whether by a sovereign nation or private 
enterprise—of materials extracted from a celestial body.141 The 
opposition supports its argument with the provisions within Article XI 
paragraph 1 of the Moon Agreement, holding that the common 
heritage principle applies to all naturally occurring resources located 
in outer space.142 The proscription of both private and public property 
rights is again announced in Article XI paragraph 3 of the Moon 
Agreement.143  
However, a narrow interpretation of Article I of the Outer 
Space Treaty counters the opposition’s argument by guaranteeing the 
freedom to explore and the use of outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies.144 Such an interpretation of space mining “is 
considered to be neither an ‘appropriation’ of space parts of outer 
space nor of resources in situ.”145 Instead, the space mining activities’ 
purpose could be understood as a “use” without any demand for 
 
 139. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at art. II. 
 140. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMAN, supra note 20, at 99. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Moon Agreement, supra note 41, at art. XI, para. 3. Article XI, para. 3 states: 
“Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or natural 
resources in place, shall become property of any State, international 
intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national organization or non-
governmental entity or of any natural person. The placement of personnel, space 
vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations on or below the surface of 
the moon, including structures connected with its surface or subsurface, shall not 
create a right of ownership over the surface or the subsurface of the moon or any 
areas thereof. The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the international 
regime referred to in paragraph 5 of this article.” 
 144. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at arts. I, II. 
 145. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMAN, supra note 20, at 99. 
  
220 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 7 
 
territorial appropriation of the celestial bodies concerned.146 An 
analogy to the legal regime of the high seas pursuant to the UNCLOS 
III agreement and its incorporation of the common heritage principle 
that allows for freedom to fish furthers this point of thinking.147 The 
failure of the Moon Agreement to garner more international support 
lends further credence to the debate that the limitations regarding 
space activities pursuant to the common heritage principle are only 
binding to the Agreements’ signatories and are not held as 
international customary law.148 Based on one’s interpretation, 
determining whether the mining of space resources amounts to 
appropriation depends on a narrow or broad interpretation of the Outer 
Space and Moon Treaties. Here, it is likely that—like fishing in the 
sea—collecting resources would likely not violate the Outer Space 
Treaty. 
2. The Application of the Province of Mankind to Space Resources 
Where did the province of mankind come to affect space 
resources? Article I of the Outer Space Treaty states that “the 
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall be ‘the province of all mankind.’”149 This 
principle is located between the language stating that the exploration 
and use of space shall be done for the benefit and in the interests of all 
humankind and the freedom to explore and use outer space.150 Article 
I may be considered of the utmost importance, as indicated by the 
Cologne Commentary on Space Law, but it was also thought to be one 
of the most controversial.151 The Cologne Commentary on Space Law 
held that the common heritage principle brings Article I and the Outer 
Space Treaty “in line with the legal regulation of human activities in 
other common spaces, such as the activities on the High Seas and the 
Deep Sea Bed.”152  
“[T]he recommendatory 1996 UN Space Benefits 
Declaration” further expanded on Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, 
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particularly its Benefit Clause.153 In reiterating the province of 
humankind principle in the Declaration’s Preamble, the Preamble goes 
on to hold that “[s]tates are free to determine all aspects of their 
participation in international cooperation in the exploration and use of 
outer space on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis.”154 It 
requires “full compliance with the legitimate rights and interests of the 
parties concerned.”155  
Article IV paragraph 1 of the Moon Agreement also restates 
the province of mankind principle in close proximity to the Benefit 
Clause.156 However, Article XI paragraph 1 declared the Moon, 
celestial bodies, and their natural resources are included in the 
common heritage of mankind.157 Article XI paragraph 5, though, states 
that nations should undertake and establish an international regime “to 
govern the exploitation of natural resources of the [Moon] as such 
exploitation is about to become feasible.”158 Interpretations of the 
common heritage of mankind, however, are dependent on the context 
of its use and purpose for future regulatory application.159 
Additionally, the common heritage of mankind has no further effect 
on the present exploitation and use of lunar resources apart from the 
establishment of a future exploitation regime.160 An expectation exists 
that parties bound to the Moon Agreement should make a good faith 
effort to organize an international conference and agree upon an 
international regime.161 However, parties are not bound to reach an 
agreement, and such a conference may reject the principle of the 
common heritage of mankind altogether.162 A new, more liberal scope 
may even be applied to the principle.163 Based on this analysis, the 
common heritage principle is in flux, and its application to space is 
still uncertain. 
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B. Why the Law of the Sea Is Not Fit for Space 
Outer space and the Earth’s oceans share many similarities, 
which makes the law of the sea appear ideal to build a suitable system 
to guide property rights in outer space. However, the common heritage 
principle embedded in UNCLOS III presents an obstacle to granting 
the freedom to exploit outer space resources. The original authors of 
the Moon Agreement also agreed with the sentiment of UNCLOS III, 
which heavily influenced the Moon Agreement.164 One particular note 
taken from UNCLOS III was the regulation of seabed mining.165 The 
Moon Agreement intended that resources falling outside the territories 
of nation-states—in this case, off-Earth resources—belong to the 
common heritage of mankind.166 Developed nations are concerned 
with the possible commercial exploitation of outer space and the 
protection of such investments.167 
Some argue that the common heritage principle found in 
UNCLOS III conflicts with the purpose of the Outer Space Treaty 
because the meaning of the common heritage principle is unclear.168 
Moreover, they claim that interpretations of the common heritage 
principle clash between developed and developing countries.169 
Developing nations interpreted the common heritage principle to mean 
that all space resources are the common property to all nations, and 
international control is necessary for redistributing wealth and 
technology between nations.170 The United States, however, took a 
more laissez-faire approach and interpreted the common heritage 
principle to mean free access in exploring and exploiting space 
resources.171  
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In drafting a treaty, agreement on definitions is necessary to 
create reciprocal commitments between the signatories.172 Thus, 
signatories are only bound to their respective interpretations at the 
signing of the treaty.173 Drafters would likely impute the UNCLOS III 
interpretation of the common heritage principle to the Moon 
Agreement.174 As defined in the UNCLOS agreements, the common 
heritage principle holds that all nations are entitled to a share in profits 
from the exploitation of seabed resources.175 UNCLOS III empowers 
the Sea Bed Authority, which is, in part, controlled by a two-thirds 
vote of signatory nations,176 to maintain the extraction of seabed 
resources in conformity to the common heritage principle.177 In 
attempting to reconcile the interpretations, the developing nations 
would likely win out as they did in UNCLOS III because of their 
superior number compared to already established space-faring 
nations.178 Thus, space-faring nations would be outvoted for their 
proposed interpretation and be bound to the developing nations’ 
definition of the common heritage principle.179 This development 
would, therefore, operationally incorporate UNCLOS III’s 
interpretation of the common heritage principle into the Moon 
Agreement because of the desire of developing nations to have a 
system similar to the Sea Bed Authority.180 
Under this approach, there are two points of contention with 
the Outer Space Treaty principles.181 The first issue is that developing 
nations regard the benefit for all of mankind as meaning ownership by 
all nations.182 Second, the owner not only has the right to use their 
property, but also to exclude others who are opposed by the majority 
of owners.183 
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Others argue, however, that accepting the developing 
countries’ interpretation of mankind to mean all nations violates the 
Benefit Clause of the Outer Space Treaty.184 Each nation would 
perceive itself to be an owner in which they are entitled to a vote and 
a share of the benefits.185  However, a plurality of nations would likely 
fail to represent humankind adequately, and the plurality alone would 
achieve their interest.186 Developing nations—who would likely make 
up the majority of voting members and desire a regime similar to the 
International Seabed Authority—could then require that the nations in 
defiance of the Benefit Clause receive the profits of space activities.187 
This provision was not meant to reward those that did not contribute 
to or take part in the risk of the activity.188 In contrast to the common 
heritage principle, the “benefit” provision does not mandate wealth 
distribution in which only a segment of humankind receives a 
benefit.189 
Common ownership would also impact the free use principle 
of the celestial body.190 By requiring a majority approval, free use 
would be limited without permission.191 As the majority, developing 
nations’ interest could hamper the development of celestial 
exploitation because of the competition of their mining operations 
with the importation of new minerals.192 The ability of developing 
nations to limit or eliminate the free use principle directly conflicts 
with the general purpose of the Outer Space Treaty.193 
An implementation of the law of the sea before the advocation 
of restrictions seems to be a more relevant model than the adoption of 
the UNCLOS agreement. The space law regime today bears 
substantial similarities to the ocean law following the 1958 UNCLOS 
but preceding the 1982 UNCLOS III agreement.194 At that time, an 
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agreement existed on vague freedoms of the sea, but little could be 
agreed upon otherwise.195 States also possessed the ability to pick and 
choose from which of the 1958 provisions they would adhere to as 
states can do now among the existing outer space treaties.196 Also, as 
with the pre-1982 UNCLOS agreement, a relatively small number of 
nations with the ability to exploit the realm defined as the space 
regime.197 Today’s space law is characterized by broad principles that 
are exposed to unilateral interpretation.198 
A new space law regime cannot adopt the common heritage 
principle of UNCLOS if private entities are to conduct space activities 
successfully. A new regime must take into account the interest of all 
of humankind and not the will of the developing majority nations. For 
a successful transition, the new governing authority must be fair and 
allow the development of space mining to occur equitably. The core 
of the law of the sea is, therefore, unsatisfactory as the building blocks 
of a future space regime. 
C. The Antarctica Model Cannot Survive in Space 
The main goal of restructuring space law and creating a new 
space authority is the exploitation of celestial resources. The 
Antarctica Treaty appears to be a suitable candidate to form the 
principles of space law because its purpose is to protect the peaceful 
exploration of a hostile environment.199 However, the Antarctica 
Treaty model lacks an authority to govern the exploration and 
development of space; the treaty only allows for consultation between 
the signatories in a conference mechanism.200  
The conference structure of the Antarctica Treaty proves to be 
an inadequate model for the development of space for two reasons.201 
First, the Antarctica Treaty proves untested for providing guidance in 
this regard because few resources202 worthy of development have been 
found in Antarctica.203 In the instance of a party aggressively 
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appropriating territory in Antarctica, the conference mechanisms also 
remain unproven.204 Following the ratification of the Antarctica 
Treaty, several countries still claimed possession to territory in 
Antarctica, thus displaying the faults of the agreement.205  
Second, the exponential increase in cost for the mining of 
space resources, compared to mining in Antarctica, requires greater 
reassurance in the right to mine in order to entice investors.206 The lack 
of a governing authority to facilitate the mining of space is undesirable 
for private entities risking their investment.207 The Moon Agreement 
and the law of the sea fail to provide a cohesive remedy for addressing 
the faults with space law. A new regime that is not based on prior 
multilateral agreements is necessary for the development of a new 
regime.208 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
The current regimes of international law addressing natural 
resources on Earth fail to provide an adequate framework to address 
the relatively new issues of space law and to amass adequate support. 
The failure of the UNCLOS resolution to achieve widespread 
ratification must not be repeated if a new international cooperative is 
to garner international support among both the major space-faring 
nations and those countries still developing space programs. 
Potentially exhausting all the global resources could be mitigated or 
prevented if private investors had the backing and security of a global 
community. An authoritative body, unlike the non-confrontational 
conference arrangement in the Antarctica Treaty, is needed to resolve 
disputes and prevent the appropriation of celestial bodies. 
In order to facilitate a fair and cooperative process, an 
assembly of both developed and developing nations with and without 
space launching capabilities could issue authorization permits for 
mining to private entities. The U.S. Space Act provides a foundation 
for a new regime. To facilitate justice, a tribunal of rotating nations 
would enforce the permits and punish those who violate international 
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space law. A method of arbitration could also be established to ensure 
a fair process in which the group of nations will oversee. 
A. Creation of a Multinational Organization 
Article XI paragraph 5 of the Moon Agreement states that 
signatories should create an international regime to oversee the mining 
and extraction of celestial resources.209 There is no further guidance 
as to structure; the Moon Agreement simply states that an international 
regime should be created once it becomes feasible to exploit 
resources.210 The drafters likely envisioned an international regime to 
monitor and promote the peaceful exploitation of celestial resources.  
The purpose behind establishing an impartial, multinational 
organization is that it allows for cooperation between space and non-
space faring countries. By including both groups, the interests of 
humankind as a whole may be taken into account. The organization 
will represent an equal number of space and non-spacefaring nations 
so that no one side could influence the decisions. A neutral third party, 
such as an expert in space law, would provide the last vote. 
Multilateral agreements will help ensure the harmonizing of national 
legislation and aid in the elimination of uncertainties regarding private 
property rights. The U.S. Space Act provides a guide for establishing 
the roles of the new regime.  
Private entities will apply for a permit with a proposal, which 
the board has the discretion to approve. Because the committee is 
composed of different nations, the citizen requirement is moot. The 
proposal should detail which resources will be mined, the location of 
the celestial body, and the proposed method of extraction. Should the 
committee approve the proposal, the private entity would receive a 
license permitting extraction to that celestial body. The permit grants 
the property rights for the collection and transportation of the gathered 
resources.  
The fees from these permits could be utilized for the 
improvement of science and engineering education in developing 
countries or for research funds for nations whose citizens are venturing 
into space. This would help distribute the fees and encourage 
developed nations to continue funding research and development at 
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their discretion. The distribution of fees to developing nations may 
also aid in offsetting the revenue lost by importing the celestial 
resources. 
B. Enforcement of Property Rights 
The granting of new property rights will likely create 
numerous issues, from trespassing to piracy. Currently, nations do not 
possess jurisdiction above the atmosphere. Therefore, a new tribunal 
that oversees disputes and determines the proper remedy is necessary. 
Whether through a trial framework or a form of alternative dispute 
resolution, a court with jurisdiction in space must be available for 
private parties seeking legal action. 
 The framework for the International Space Station 
demonstrates that nations possess jurisdiction for their nationals in 
space. An authoritative governing structure could hold nations 
accountable by imposing fines, reducing permits, and other 
restrictions. As nations possessed jurisdiction over their sailing vessels 
while on the high seas, nations now should be seen as the keeper for 
their vessels into space. This would also allow for binding judgments 
should a nation fail to police their own nationals. 
The issue of enforcement would occur if there were conflicting 
claims or a breach of space law. One solution is the creation of a 
tribunal in which private entities could bring claims. A panel of judges 
or administrators would hear the matter and issue a decree. These 
judges would be selected from a pool of adjudicators whose interests 
should be neutral to the conflict. To safeguard neutrality, the pool of 
judges should be multinational and comprised of experts in space and 
international law. In the instance of an appeal, the panel could be 
assembled en banc so that all judges of the court are present to hear 
the case. Ensuring neutrality will protect the integrity of the court and 
prevent the interest of parties from tainting the ruling. 
Another method, that is currently employed by some 
international agreements, would be a provision to arbitrate disputes. 
By agreeing to arbitration at the onset of the process, parties will know 
what to expect in the instance of a claim. Other forms of alternative 
dispute resolution may also be available if the parties were to seek 
another means of resolving the dispute. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
If a private entity’s property rights are to be protected in outer 
space, the current regime of space law requires a significant 
restructuring, if not a rebirth. The Outer Space Treaty and its relevant 
influences are too ambiguous regarding property. Current multilateral 
agreements contain too many restrictions or do not adequately provide 
a sufficient base to model the new space regime. While the law of the 
sea is an enticing starting point, the common heritage principle found 
within the UNCLOS III agreement removes the law of the sea from 
the running as a viable foundation for a new regime. The Antarctica 
Treaty is also disqualified because it lacks a strong authoritative body 
to resolve disputes.  
A new space regime seems like the most appropriate course of 
action due to the development of space technology since the launch of 
Sputnik. With a new multinational organization to oversee and 
monitor space activities, private entities would receive the recognition 
and assurance in property rights that they desire. Along with the new 
organization, a form of dispute resolution is required to resolve claims 
originating in space because no nation has jurisdiction above the 
atmosphere. With current needs that cannot be solved here on Earth, 
the exploitation of an almost infinite resource should not be denied.  
 
